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THE CIVIL OPINIONS OF
JUDGE PHYLLIS A. KRAVITCH: A TRIBUTE
Stephen J. Wermielt
Judge Phyllis Kravitch's tenure on the Eleventh Circuit truly
mirrors the society in which she served, with many of the most
interesting, important and often difficult legal questions of the
day passing through her courtroom. From issues of gay rights to
free speech, employment discrimination to liability for
environmental cleanup, Judge Kravitch has left her mark as a
good judge, neither shying away from the hard issues that came
before her nor reaching out to decide questions that were
unnecessary to the resolution of the case. Throughout her
opinions, her commitment is a clear one-to make certain that
the judicial system operates in a manner that is fair and that
fosters justice. This commitment is not expressed with the fiery
passion of a political leader but with the careful rhetoric and
analysis of a judge. She has never hesitated to dissent on
occasions when she believes her colleagues have gone awry.
Among 548 majority opinions and more than 100 additional
dissents and concurrences that Judge Kravitch has authored, it is
difficult to pick a representative handful; however, a few
examples of the more controversial issues that Judge Kravitch
has faced, and her sense of fairness and justice in handling them,
are outlined in this essay.
In Caro-Galvan v. Curtis Richardson, Inc.,' she ruled that
seasonal workers who harvested ferns on a farm in Florida and
were housed year-round in cramped and unsanitary trailers were
entitled to the protections of federal labor laws designed to
protect migrant workers against unfair working conditions. Even
though the workers here did not migrate from site-to-site, but
were instead permanently housed, Judge Kravitch construed the
statutory definition of "seasonal or temporary housing" to depend
"on the nature of the relationship between the workers'
employment and housing, not on the duration of the workers'

' Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University.
1. 993 F.2d 1500 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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stay."2 Her decision for the en banc Court overruled a district

judge's dismissal of the case.
On the subject of affirmative action, Judge Kravitch decided
one of the pressing issues of the day according to the prevailing
law at the time, although the Supreme Court later went in a
different direction. In South Florida Chapter of Associated
General Contractorsof America Inc. v. MetropolitanDade County,
Florida,3 she upheld a "set aside" program to benefit minorityowned companies bidding on county contracts. Judge Kravitch
ruled that the county was capable of making legitimate findings
of past discrimination and of narrowly tailoring the program to
correct the problem. Judge Kravitch's approach to this volatile
issue was the predominant view in federal circuit courts for much
of the decade of the 1980's until the Supreme Court decided City
of Richmond v. Croson Co.,4 which concluded that state and local
governments were not generally competent to adopt "set-aside"
programs unless there was extensive, documented evidence of
past discrimination and unless the program was designed to
benefit the actual victims of that past discrimination.
Throughout her tenure on the Eleventh Circuit, Judge
Kravitch has faced difficult cases alleging employment
discrimination in violation of federal law. In Walker v. Ford
Motor Co.,' she found that the repeated use of racial epithets by
employees at a Tampa, Florida, car dealership was sufficient to
create a racially discriminatory work environment for a black
employee, even if many of the comments were not specifically
directed at one individual. In the same decision, however, she
said that federal law limited the amount of back pay to which the
employee was entitled when he was fired for complaining about
6 she
the racial harassment. In Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers,
reinstated a sexual harassment lawsuit by a trucking company
worker in Duluth, Georgia, ruling that a district judge gave short
shrift to the evidence of a hostile working environment and of
quid pro quo harassment when he granted summary judgment
for the employer. In Byrd v. Lakeshore Hospital,' Judge Kravitch

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Id
723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984).
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
684 F.2d 1355 (11th Cir. 1982).
830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987).
30 F.3d 1380 (11th Cir. 1994).
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ruled that a district court imposed too great a burden of proof on
a worker who said she was fired because of absences from the job
due to her pregnancy. Judge Kravitch found that the employer
had violated the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act.8
In Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control District,9 Judge
Kravitch dissented from a panel decision upholding the discharge
of a firefighter who was reassigned to light duty after he was
diagnosed as HIV-positive. She said that under federal law
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap," the
firefighter's HIV-positive condition could not serve as a major
reason for his dismissal." The trial record, she said, showed
that he was improperly dismissed because of his HIV status.'
Immunity for government employees is another issue Judge
Kravitch has faced. In Jenkins v. Talladega City Board of
Education," Judge Kravitch found that there was no qualified
immunity from damages under federal civil rights law for two
Alabama teachers who strip-searched two eight-year-old girls in
search of seven dollars reported missing by another student. In a
decision that is otherwise free of strong rhetoric or broad
pronouncements, Judge Kravitch said the two teachers acted in
"blatant disregard" of the students' rights to be free from
unreasonable searches. 4 The full Eleventh Circuit has vacated
Judge15 Kravitch's opinion and granted en banc rehearing in the
case.

Judge Kravitch had a long involvement with the Eleventh
Circuit's struggle over the treatment of Haitian refugees, ruling
in Jean v. Nelson 6 that the government could not discriminate
because of national origin in deciding whether to parole Haitian
refugees from detention camps where they were being held
pending a determination of their immigration status. When the
Eleventh Circuit reversed in an en banc decision, 7 Judge

8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
1996)
14.
15.
16.
17.

935 F.2d 1179 (11th Cir. 1991).
29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994) (Rehabilitation Act).
Severino, 935 F.2d at 1183.
Id.
95 F.3d 1036 (11th Cir.), vacated, reh'g granted 1996 WL 606638 (11th Cir.
(en banc).
Id. at 1047.
Id. at 1036.
711 F.2d 1455 (11th Cir. 1983).
Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc), affd 472 U.S. 846

(1985).
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Kravitch dissented, 8 chiding that the majority "unnecessarily
and incorrectly eroded those few rights to which the courts have
determined excludable aliens are entitled
under either
19
Constitution."
the
or
statutes
Congressional
She was involved in numerous cases under the First
Amendment, sometimes in dissent. In Nationalist Movement v.
City of Cumming, Georgia," she upheld a local ordinance
banning parades on Saturday mornings, rejecting a challenge by
a group that wished to protest against celebration of Dr. Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s birthday. In Fulani v. Krivanek,2" she
invalidated a Florida law that barred minor-party political
candidates from being able to take advantage of a waiver of the
processing fee for certifying signatures needed to get on the
ballot. In Daniel v. City of Tampa, Florida,2 she upheld a
Florida trespass statute that was used to prosecute an individual
for distributing leaflets and posting signs at a public housing
project. She concluded that the law was content-neutral and
allowed other means of communication for persons who were not
lawfully on housing project property.
When a panel of the Eleventh Circuit refused a request for a
preliminary injunction that would have placed candidate David
Duke on the 1992 Republican presidential primary ballot, Duke
v. Cleland,' Judge Kravitch dissented.' She wrote:
The Republican Party of Georgia and the state seek to
exclude Duke from the primary ballot because they believe
that the Party will suffer embarrassment and adverse
publicity by virtue of his candidacy for the Republican
nomination. No political body, however, has a constitutional
right to freedom from embarrassment or adverse publicity. 5
Judge Kravitch has also taken part in two of the more
significant gay rights cases to come before any court in recent
years. When the Eleventh Circuit decided the case of Hardwick v.
Bowers, 6 the panel found that the Georgia sodomy law
18. Id. at 986.
19. Id.

20. 92 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 1996).
21. 973 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1992).
22. 38 F.3d 546 (11th Cir. 1994).
23. 954 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1992).

24. Id. at 1532.
25. Id. at 1538.
26. 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
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infringed the constitutional rights of homosexuals and remanded
the case to see if the state could provide sufficient justification
for the statute. Judge Kravitch filed a separate concurring and
dissenting opinion,27 concluding that the Georgia statute was
clearly valid under Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney,28 an
established Supreme Court precedent that she said the panel
tried improperly to dismiss. She wrote, "Whatever our personal
views about the constitutionality of a law that permits the state
to regulate the most private human behavior within the confines
of the home, unless and until the Supreme Court clearly
by that Court's decision in Doe
indicates otherwise, we are bound
29
Attorney."
Commonwealth's
v.
In Shahar v. Bowers,30 the panel reversed a grant of summary
judgment for Georgia Attorney General Michael Bowers in a
lawsuit alleging that he violated the constitutional rights of a
woman by withdrawing a job offer to her when he learned that
she planned a marriage ceremony to her lesbian companion. The
panel found that the right of intimate association protected the
actions of the woman and sent the case back to trial to determine
if the state could provide a compelling interest for its actions.
Judge Kravitch wrote a separate concurring and dissenting
opinion,3 ' concluding that by requiring strict scrutiny the panel
had struck the wrong balance between the state's interests as an
employer and the woman's right to intimate association.
Nevertheless, while striking the balance differently, Judge
Kravitch still concluded that summary judgment should have
been granted to the woman on her claim of a violation of her
freedom of intimate association.32 The full Eleventh Circuit has
vacated the opinion and granted en banc rehearing in the case.33
Her record also includes a number of significant statutory
cases. In Teper v. Miller,' she found that federal election laws
preempt a Georgia statute that prohibits state legislators during

1039 (1986).
27. Id. at 1212.
28. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
29. 760 F.2d at 1216.
30. 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated, reh'g granted 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir.
1996) (en banc).
31. 70 F.3d at 1228.
32. Id. at 1234.
33. Id. at 1218.

34. 82 F.3d 989 (11th Cir. 1996).
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the annual legislative session from accepting campaign
contributions to run for Congress or other federal office. In U.S.
v. Fleet Factors Corp.,3 5 Judge Kravitch ruled that a secured
creditor may incur liability for environmental cleanup of
hazardous wastes if the creditor participated in financial
management of a company to a degree sufficient to influence its
hazardous waste disposal plan. The decision interpreted the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (the Superfund law).36

35. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1994).

